United States Air Force

T.O. 21M-LGM25C-1

Published by Good Press, 2022
goodpress@okpublishing.info
EAN 4064066417222

Table of Contents


INTRODUCTION
LAUNCH COMPLEX FACILITIES
LAUNCH COMPLEX.
MISSILE SILO.
SILO CLOSURE DOOR.
CONTROL CENTER.
BLAST LOCK, CABLE-WAYS, AND DECONTAMINATION AREA.
ACCESS PORTAL.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.
AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, AND VENTILATION SYSTEM.
CONTROL CENTER AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM.
ACCESS PORTAL AND BLAST LOCK VENTILATING SYSTEM.
LAUNCH DUCT AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM.
CHILLED WATER SYSTEM.
COOLING WATER SYSTEM.
ELECTRICAL POWER.
COMMERCIAL POWER.
STANDBY POWER.
PERMISSIVE CONTROL.
FACILITY POWER CONTROL BOARD.
MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS.
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS.
FIRE WATER SYSTEM.
FIRE PROTECTION AND PREVENTION SYSTEM.
DOMESTIC WATER SYSTEM.
INDUSTRIAL WATER SYSTEM.
FIRE WATER RECIRCULATION SYSTEM (After MCL 3315) .
FIRE WATER CONTROL SWITCH (After MCL 3316) .
PROPELLANT TRANSFER SYSTEM.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS.
HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT HS-1.
HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT HS-2.
HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT HS-3.
HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT HS-4.
HAZARD SENSING AND WARNING SYSTEM.
FIRE SENSING EQUIPMENT.
FIXED VAPOR SENSING EQUIPMENT.
MAINTENANCE GROUND EQUIPMENT (MGE) .
PORTABLE MAINTENANCE GROUND EQUIPMENT.
NON-PORTABLE MAINTENANCE GROUND EQUIPMENT.
LAUNCH CONTROL SET.
LAUNCH CONTROL COMPLEX FACILITIES CONSOLE.
CONTROL-MONITOR GROUP.
POWER DISTRIBUTION CONTROL.
MISSILE SYSTEMS FAULT LOCATOR.
SIGNAL FLOW.
CODED SWITCH SYSTEM (CSS) .
BUTTERFLY VALVE LOCK.
BUTTERFLY VALVE LOCK CONTROL.
BUTTERFLY VALVE LOCK STATUS ENCODER.
BUTTERFLY VALVE LOCK STATUS DECODER AND DISPLAY.
ELECTRONIC COMMAND SIGNALS PROGRAMMER.
28 VDC POWER SUPPLIES.
BATTERY POWER SUPPLIES.
THRUST MOUNT AND SHOCK ISOLATION SYSTEM.
THRUST MOUNT.
SHOCK ISOLATION SYSTEM.
INERTIAL GUIDANCE SYSTEM.
MISSILE GUIDANCE ALIGNMENT-CHECKOUT GROUP.
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AIR COOLERS
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS.
INTRA-COMPLEX COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.
DIRECT LINES.
WIRE-TYPE MAINTENANCE NETWORK.
RADIO TYPE MAINTENANCE NETWORK.
TRANSCEIVER USE & STORAGE.
TRANSCEIVER BATTERY CHARGERS.
TRANSCEIVER OPERATION.
BASE STATION.
RTMN OVERRIDE.
RTMN HEADSETS FOR EMERGENCY BREATHING APPARATUS.
VOICE SIGNALLING SYSTEM.
TELEVISION SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM.
PROBLEM ANALYSIS.
INTER-COMPLEX COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.
DIRECT LINES.
DIAL LINES.
INTER-COMPLEX RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.
PROBLEM ANALYSIS.
EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.
465L COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.
487L COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.
PRIMARY ALERTING SYSTEM.
UHF RADIO.
PROBLEM ANALYSIS.
ANTENNA SYSTEMS
RADIO-TYPE MAINTENANCE NETWORK ANTENNAS.
INTER-COMPLEX RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ANTENNAS.
HF DISCAGE ANTENNA.
HF HARD ANTENNA.
UHF HARD ANTENNA.
ON-SITE REPEATERS (LRAFB) .
POWER DISTRIBUTION.
COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES
COMMUNICATIONS DISCIPLINE
LGM-25C MISSILE
AIRFRAME
Missile Characteristics
ROCKET ENGINE SYSTEM
AIRBORNE PROPELLANT SYSTEM
AUTOGENOUS PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
FUEL TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS.
AIRBORNE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
AIRBORNE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
EXPLOSIVE COMPONENTS
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
MISSILE GUIDANCE SET
RE-ENTRY VEHICLE
SAFETY
HAZARD SENSING AND WARNING EQUIPMENT
FIRE SENSING EQUIPMENT.
FIXED VAPOR SENSING EQUIPMENT.
VAPOR DETECTOR ANNUNCIATOR PANEL.
KLAXON AND SURFACE WARNINGS.
AREA SECURITY SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT
ROCKET FUEL HANDLER'S CLOTHING OUTFIT.
PROTECTIVE AND EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT CABINET
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
ESCAPE ROUTES
EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF INJURED PERSONNEL
PERSONNEL ACCESS LIMITATIONS
EWO TOOL KIT
SECTION VII MISSILE COMBAT CREW DUTIES
INTRODUCTION.
MISSILE COMBAT CREW COMMANDER.
DEPUTY MISSILE COMBAT CREW COMMANDER.
MISSILE SYSTEMS ANALYST TECHNICIAN.
MISSILE FACILITY TECHNICIAN,
Launch Checklist
Public Domain

INTRODUCTION

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The LGM-25C Weapon System consists of an inertially guided, liquid fueled, airborne weapon and associated ground equipment necessary to maintain and launch the airborne weapon. The weapon system is capable of destroying enemy targets over 5000 nautical miles distant. The launch complex is designed to maintain an operational readiness condition with no outside support after sustaining an attack that destroys all non-hardened facilities. For maximum safety and effectiveness, individual launch complexes are separated by distance of 7 to 10 nautical miles. All in-commission missiles are maintained in a constant alert condition and may be counted down individually or simultaneously. Safety rules for the LGM-25C (Titan II) MK6 RV/MK53 Weapon System (U) are contained in AFR 122-22. Squadron maintenance areas provide facilities for supply, administration, operations, and maintenance necessary to maintain the launch complexes in a constant state of readiness.

LAUNCH COMPLEX FACILITIES

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LAUNCH COMPLEX.

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figure 1-1The launch complex includes both above ground and hardened underground facilities. Hardened facilities include the missile silo, control center, blast lock, interconnecting cable-ways, emergency escape hatch, and hardened communications equipment. Above ground, non-hardened facilities include vehicle parking areas, security fencing and lighting, propellant and electrical connections, static grounding system, commercial power lines, a transformer, cooling tower pits, access portal, non-hardened antennas, soft water storage, area security surveillance system, and weather instruments.

MISSILE SILO.

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The missile silo (figure 1-2) is a reinforced, concrete structure with inside dimensions of approximately 146 feet in depth and 55 feet in diameter. A launch duct, constructed with a sound-attenuating lining, is located in the center of the silo. Associated installed equipment and structures include a silo closure door, retractable work platforms, hazard sensing devices, and a small equipment and personnel elevator operating between levels 2 and 8. Two exhaust ducts carry missile exhaust and ingested air from the flame deflector, through deflecting cascade vanes, to the surface. Equipment areas are located between the launch duct and the missile silo walls on nine separate levels. Equipment contained on the various levels is as follows:

figure 1-2

SILO CLOSURE DOOR.

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The launch silo closure door consists of the closure door, wheel trucks, track rails, buffers and a door actuating system. The door actuating system consists of rail bridge jacks, door locks, a drive unit, cables, a pneudraulic power system, and electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic controls. 1-9. The door is a 740-ton structure of steel and concrete mounted on four 4-wheeled truck assemblies. The purpose of the door Is to protect the silo from nearby nuclear blasts and resulting radiation. When closed, the door rests upon a seal with truck wheels clear of the rails. Door locks hold the door in the lowered, locked position, preventing movement from shock or vibration. For maintenance, the door may be opened or closed locally from the silo closure maintenance control panel located at silo level 1 after being activated by a key switch. The door is normally opened automatically during launch sequence by the control-monitor group in the control center. Door opening, by local control, is initiated by pressing and holding the silo closure maintenance control panel UNLOCK push-button until an unlocked indication is present. An override open panel mounted directly below and electrically connected to the maintenance control panel, contains electrical circuitry to automatically bypass faulty circuits of the maintenance control panel. An override close control panel is located beside the maintenance control panel and may be operated manually by a push-button mounted on the face of the panel in the event of an automatic close control failure. A door lock cylinder directional control valve solenoid is energized and directs hydraulic fluid at 3315 to 3525 psig from pressurized accumulators to the four lock cylinder unlock ports. The door locks rotate and lower to the fully unlocked and lowered position. Pressing and holding the silo closure maintenance control panel RAISE push-button energizes the rail bridge jacks directional control valve solenoid, directing hydraulic fluid to four rail bridge jack cylinders, raising the door wheel trucks even with the track rails. Pressing and holding the silo closure maintenance control panel OPEN push-button energizes the drive unit directional control valve solenoid, directing fluid to the drive unit motors. The drive unit motors turn two drum units with wrap cables attached to the closure door, opening the silo closure door. The door is arrested by hydraulic buffers, preventing damage to door and door arresters. Limit switches are installed at door activating locks, rail bridge jacks, and door arresting points, to monitor silo closure door opening and closing cycles from the silo closure maintenance control panel, control-monitor group (CMG), and launch control complex facilities console (LCCFC). The door is closed locally by the CLOSE, LOWER, and LOCK push-buttons on the silo closure maintenance control panel. The door is buffered by the door closing buffer. During launch sequence, the door is automatically controlled by the CMG and door limit switches. Upon demand, the door locks rotate and lower, the door raises, and the drive unit is energized. The force of the drive unit opens the closure door within 17 to 21 seconds, including unlocking and raising time. Debris on tracks may extend opening time. If silo closure door opening buffers or bumpers have been destroyed by a blast, an emergency means of stopping the door is required to prevent damage to the drive cables and hydraulic system by over-travel of the door. Emergency door stopping capability is provided by removal of both the 4-foot track rail sections and the adjacent 2-foot removable sections. Rail sections are stored on a concrete slab near the silo closure door tracks for ease of replacement when required. The silo closure door will operate normally with these rail sections removed and opening buffers and bumpers intact. If the silo closure overruns Limit switches, the silo closure (fully) open signal will be locked up in CMG-1 and launch sequence will continue.

To close the door, the sequence is reversed. The cable system drives the door to the full closed position and the hydraulic shock absorber in the door closing buffer slows it to a stop. Two sequencing controls lower the rail bridge jacks and set the door on a seal. The control then actuates the locking mechanisms, securing the door in place. Closing time is 17 to 21 seconds.

CONTROL CENTER.

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The control center (figure 1-3) is a buried, reinforced, concrete structure designed to withstand the effects of a nuclear blast. The ground shock accompanying the blast is nullified in the control center by a three-level, steel, shock- isolation cage, which is supported by eight shock mounts hung from the domed roof. Grounding of the control center is accomplished by completely enclosing the structure with a 1/4-inch steel shell. The control center contains living quarters, communications equipment, battery power supplies, equipment for checkout and monitoring of the weapon system, and equipment for initiating launch sequence. These facilities allow the missile combat crew to maintain an alert condition with a minimum of down time. By the use of monitoring equipment contained in the control center, malfunctions which could affect launch capability can be recognized and isolated. Radio, telephone, and loudspeaker systems provide inter- and intra-site communications. VAFB equipment is not shown in figure 1-3.

BLAST LOCK, CABLE-WAYS, AND DECONTAMINATION AREA.

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(See figure 1-4.) The blast lock is a buried, rectangular shaped, reinforced concrete structure with steel blast doors at all personnel openings. The blast lock is adjacent to the access portal and decontamination area. Cable-ways extend from the blast lock to the control center and from the decontamination area to the silo. The cable-ways are 9-1/2 feet in diameter, and are constructed with steel floors. Cable-ways provide for passage of personnel and equipment, control wiring, utility distribution, air ducts, and piping. Blast door No. 8 is installed where the cable-way from the control center connects with blast lock junction No. 201. Blast door No. 9 separates blast lock junction No. 201 and the decontamination area. The personnel decontamination area, located between blast door No. 9 and silo cable-way, contains a dressing room, decontamination shower, and an emergency reporting net telephone. The decontamination area is used for showering prior to removal of rocket fuel handler's clothing outfits. The rocket fuel handler's clothing outfits are not stored at the launch complex. 1-13. The blast lock structure provides blast-protected entry from the access portal to the hardened facility and between the control center and the launch silo. Four blast-resistant doors, interlocked in pairs, are manually opened and closed. The doors are secured in the closed position by hydraulically operated latches. Adjacent to each blast door, on each side of the wall, is a control station with OPEN and CLOSE (LOCK and UNLOCK at VAFB) push-buttons which engage or disengage the hydraulic latches. The blast doors are interlocked in pairs; 6 with 7, and 8 with 9. Pressing either push-button dc-energizes the control circuitry of the mating door, preventing the two doors from being opened at the same time. If normal hydraulic power fails, the latches can be operated by manual hydraulic pumps which override the Interlock feature. After MCL 3226, for blast lock entry from the access portal area, the push-button on the push-button-alarm light panel mounted on the LCCFC must be momentarily pressed at the same time the OPEN push-button for door No. 6 is pressed. A buzzer will sound when blast door 6 is open. The buzzer may be silenced by pressing the .alarm silence push-button.

ACCESS PORTAL.

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