USI Strategic Year Book
2016
United Service Institution of India
Strategic Year Book
2016
Editor
Lieutenant General P K Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
Director USI
United Service Institution of India
New Delhi
Vij Books India Pvt Ltd
New Delhi (India)
United Service Institute of India
Strategic Year Book 2016
Published in 2016
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Editorial Team
Editor
Lieutenant General PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM, (Retd), Director USI
Advisory Board
Air Marshal Bharat Kumar PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
Vice Admiral AK Singh PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd)
Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd)
Major General BK Sharma, AVSM, SM and Bar (Retd)
Research Coordinators
Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retd)
Dr Roshan Khaniejo
This publication has been conceptualised by the Director, USI and his staff. It incorporates commissioned contributions from recognised subject experts. The USI would like to thank various individuals who contributed their expertise to compilation of this publication. The views expressed herein are of the authors and not of the USI.
Contents
Introduction
Section I
1. India’s National Vision, Values, Interests and Strategic Objectives
Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd)
Section II: Internal Security Horizon Scan
2. Changing Nature of Low Intensity Conflicts in The Northeast: Its Internal And External Linkages
Lieutenant General VK Nayar, PVSM, SM (Retd)
3. Emerging Socio-Political and Security Developments in J&K and Implications For National Security
Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM and Bar (Retd)
4. Left Wing Extremism and Its Implications for Internal Security
Lieutenant General Gautam Banerjee PVSM, AVSM, YSM (Retd)
5. Profiling The Threat of Religious Fundamentalism in India
Dr Ajai Sahni
Section III: India’s Immediate Neighbourhood
6. China’s Strategic Behaviour and Its Impact on India
Shri R S Kalha, IFS (Retd)
7. Dynamics of Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region
Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retd)
8. India and its Southern and Northeastern Neighbours
Dr Sheel Kant Sharma, IFS (Retd)
9. Spectrum of Challenges From an Unstable Pakistan and Implications For India
Shri Vivek Katju, IFS (Retd)
10. Whither Afghanistan: Portends and Implications for India
Shri Jayant Prasad, IFS (Retd)
Section IV: India’s Extended Neighbourhood
11. The Geopolitical Dynamics in Central Asia and Its Ramifications for India’s “Connect Central Asia Policy”
Professor Nirmala Joshi
12. India, Russia, USA: Convergences and Divergences
Shri Ajai Malhotra, IFS (Retd)
13. Strategic Environment in Southeast Asia and its Influence on India’s “Act East” Policy: What can be our Approach?
Shri Yogendra Kumar, IFS (Retd)
14. Conflicts in West Asia and Their Impact on India
Dr Adil Rasheed
Section V: India’s Threat Perception
15. Climate Change and National Security
Major Geneneral V K Naik, KC, VSM (Retd)
16. Collusive and Hybrid Threats to India’s National Security
Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd)
17. Role of Weapons of Mass Destruction in India’s Strategic Security Calculus
Dr Roshan Khanijo
18. Trends in the Militarisation of Outer Space, Cyber Space, Information Space and Use of other Disruptive Technologies
Lieutenant General Devinder Kumar, PVSM, VSM and Bar (Retd)
Section VI: India’s Comprehensive National Power
19. Rebooting India: A Case for Comprehensive National Development
Shri Sanjay Baru
20. How Credible is India’s Nuclear Deterrent?
Professor Bharat Karnad
21. Transformation of India’s Foreign Policy
Shri Kanwal Sibal, IFS (Retd)
22. Reforms in Indian Security Architecture
Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
23. India’s Approach to the Reforms of UN Institutions
Shri Ajai Malhotra, IFS (Retd)
24. Capabilities and Challenges in Cyber Security
Colonel Sanjeev Relia
25. Reforms in India’s Intelligence Set-Up
Shri R Banerji, IAS (Retd)
Section VII: India’s Defence Capability
26. Out of Area Contingencies: The Pressing Need for Covert Cross Border Capability
Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retd)
27. Modernisation of India’s Special Forces
Lieutenant General PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd)
28. An Approach to Modernisation of Ground Forces
Lieutenant General Sanjeev Chopra, AVSM and Bar, SM (Retd)
29. Application of Recent Technological Developments in the Border Security Force
Shri E N Rammohan, IPS (Retd)
30. India’s 2030 Navy: Matching Muscle with Missions
Commodore Sujeet Samaddar, NM (Retd)
31. India’s Maritime Environment: Challenges Vs Capability
Vice Admiral Anup Singh, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd)
32. Building The Final Frontier: Enhanced Space Capability
Dr Anil Lal
33. Enhancing Indian Aerospace Capabilities
Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
34. Indigenisation of Defence Industry
Major General PK Chakravorty, VSM (Retd)
35. Enhancing India’s Defence Spending
Shri Amit Cowshish
36. Building Comprehensive Deterrence Capability For India: Some Thoughts
Major General BK Sharma, AVSM, SM and Bar (Retd)
Introduction
India’s First War of Independence in 1857 ended in a fiasco, primarily for want of effective leadership and perhaps equally important, for lack of a viable strategy. Even after Independence, we have faced failure on many occasions as far as national security is concerned. The unfinished 1947- 48 War in Jammu and Kashmir (which later turned into proxy war), the 1962 debacle, the Sri Lankan experience (1987-90) could be cited as prime examples of such failures. Today, the Country is faced with a huge defence expenditure, primarily to defend our long frontiers which are still disputed, unsettled and undemarcated. To this must be added ever increasing expenditure on internal security. Yet, a feeling persists that the Country ought to be spending a lot more to meet internal security challenges and external threats.
The world at large and some amongst us have also come to believe, primarily due to western writings, that Indians as a class lack strategic culture and a capacity for strategic thought. I, of course, do not subscribe to the above idea. Given the right leadership and the cause to act, Indians have proved to be as good in strategic affairs as any other nation. 1971 War and Operation Cactus (Maldives) are the cases in point. Yes, there is definitely lack of continuity and for that there could be many reasons; the chief being the neglect of strategic issues confronting the Nation. Surely, in a Nation of 1.25 billion people there would be no dearth of strategic thinkers and those who can steer the Country through modern day geo-strategic, geo-political and geo-economic challenges.
Soon after Independence India’s rate of GDP growth had picked up from 1-1.5 per cent to about 3-3.5 per cent. With a large land mass, population, abundant natural resources and democratic system of governance, the world generally believed that India would soon be a powerful economic power but that was not to be. The rate of growth remained static giving rise to ever increasing unemployment and declining per capita incomes of the masses. The economic liberalisation set into motion in the early 1990s also tapered off for want of political consensus to undertake second and third generation reforms. As a result, India has not been able to realise its true geo-economic and geo-political potential. To this must be added the problems of national security which have not allowed us to break out of regional conundrum.
If one was to ascribe the single most important factor for the above situation, it may be said to be the lack of strategic direction during the post Independence period. It was this thought process that prompted us to try and identify the strategic landscape that the Country faces and what ought to be the strategic direction for the 21st Century that we are already well into. However, once we started identifying various areas, the list was ever expanding and we ended up identifying almost three dozen subjects that required immediate attention. Fortunately for us, the USI has a very large pool of expertise in various fields amongst its members and we were able to tap the same. Thus, the project of a USI Strategic Year Book 2016 was born and took a concrete shape. Needless to say, it is a baby step and we hope to refine and enlarge the same in the years ahead.
I am happy to say that the contributors are experts in their own fields and on being approached they willingly and enthusiastically took on the responsibilities assigned to them. I convey my heartfelt gratitude to all the contributors who have made it possible to convert a fledgling idea into reality.
The book has been divided into seven sections; each section dealing with a broad theme and comprising a number of articles under it. The sections are: India’s National Vision, Values, Interests and Strategic Objectives; Internal Security Horizon Scan; India’s Immediate Neighbourhood; India’s Extended Neighbourhood; India’s Threat Perception; India’s Comprehensive National Power; and finally, a section dealing with India’s Defence Capability.
In today’s world, Comprehensive National Power (CNP) has assumed great importance as that determines the place of a nation in the world pecking order. Not too long ago, in 2013, USI had undertaken the first ever project on CNP attempted in India and the same was published in the form of a book “Comprehensive National Power : A Model for India”, Vij Books India Private Limited, in 2013. In the current project too, we have given due importance to the CNP and the share of Military Capability in determining the same. I am afraid this is an area which requires much more work, especially in view of the fact that conventional warfare has given way to a kind of hybrid warfare whose rules are still somewhat ambiguous. Then technological developments and, capabilities in Cyber Warfare and Space have also to be factored in, to arrive at a comprehensive matrix. At USI, we have set our sights on these areas in the days to come.
Finally, a few words about India’s strategic culture and thinking. It is an intangible that constitutes an important ingredient of CNP. At the same time, its manifestations are dependent on developing strategic orientation in planning and policy formulation. It is important to take a long term view of events after due deliberations by all the stakeholders. This can only happen if national political leaders, parliamentarians, bureaucrats, diplomats, academics, intelligentsia, the scientific community and the military get used to thinking and planning strategically and, above all, in a synergised manner and not in vertical silos – a tall order but worth trying, if we are to establish a tradition of strategic culture for all times to come. This then is the raison-d’etre of this work.
Once again, I would like to express my gratitude to all the distinguished contributors, the Editorial Team and Research Coordinators who have made this work possible. It will be our endeavor to continue with this venture year after year.
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| Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) | |
| New Delhi | Director USI |
| 15 Jan 2016. |
Section I
India’s National Vision, Values, Interests And Strategic Objectives
India’s National Vision, Values, Interests and Strategic Objectives
Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd)@
Introduction
What kind of India did we (the people of India) visualise at the time of Independence; where have we reached today and where are we headed? – are some of the questions that often come to mind of a thinking Indian. The answers to the first two questions are easy because a lot has been written on the subject and the results are there for all to see. It is the future that poses a challenge and that is what I propose to discuss in this paper. While planning for the future, we have the liberty of making choices and thus apply corrections to fulfill our aspirations. At the same time, it is also important to look at the future through the prism of the past and take into account the ground realities of the present situation as also the aspirations of the people.
Aim
It is proposed to carry out a broad analysis of India’s national vision, values and interests with a view to evolve strategic objectives which are grounded in the geo-political realities of the 21st Century.
Preview
The paper is laid out as under:-
Where does India stand today?
India’s national vision and values.
India’s geopolitical environment.
National interests and strategic objectives.
Conclusion.
Where Does India Stand Today?
Democratic Polity. India has existed as an independent country for close to seven decades and by now has come to acquire a distinct character which will have a profound effect on the shape of things to come. The foremost thing that comes to mind is that over the years India has managed to establish a strong and vibrant democratic polity. By all standards, especially in the regional context, it is an achievement that all Indians can be proud of. However, the same cannot be said of the institutions of the State that are required to support a democratic country that is still making a transition from an under developed country to a developed one.
Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a measure for assessing long term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. As per the latest Human Development Report released by the United Nations Development Programme in Tokyo on 24 Jul 2014, India has ranked 135th in a list of 187 countries. Though India has made significant progress since 1980; yet it is far below developed countries like Norway, Australia, the USA etc. The Human Inequality Coefficient for India at 27.7 per cent is also fairly high and HDI when adjusted for ‘inequality’ in life expectancy at birth, in education and in income, further comes down from 0.586 to 0.418 (a loss of 28.6 percent). 1
National Security. India has been able to ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity since Independence. However, if we were to evaluate the security of our frontiers, including the people living in border areas, the balance sheet is not very impressive. We have unresolved borders with some of our neighbours. This is not only a limiting factor as far as regional cooperation is concerned but also a great drain on the national exchequer. India has to maintain large standing military forces, especially Army, to ensure sanctity of the Line of Control (LC), Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the Saltoro Ridge and the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
National Cohesion and Internal Security. India has faced many insurgencies and militancy movements since Independence. Our record of handling such movements has been laudable. However, our efforts have lacked consistency and long term policies for finding lasting solutions. Further, regression of governance in many areas in the hinterland has created new pockets of turbulence, like the Naxal affected areas. This lackadaisical approach on the part of the Central and State Governments has had an adverse impact on development of national cohesion and a spirit of nationalism.
National Morale. This is an intangible which comes into play in times of adverse geopolitical situations and national calamities. A lot depends on the national leadership in such times. India’s track record on this count has not been very encouraging. Though we have fought many wars since Independence (most of these were forced on India), we failed to foresee and prepare for them, and when forced into an armed conflict, failed to carry it to its logical conclusion. As a nation, we have not shown enough resilience and perseverance during times of adversity. There is thus a need to reinforce and build the intangibles of national morale, leadership and national cohesion.
National Vision
What is our national vision? There is no official document put out by the Government of India outlining the national vision. However, in the 1990s, a document titled ‘India Vision 2020’ was prepared by the Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC) of India under the chairmanship of Dr APJ Abdul Kalam and a team of 500 experts.2 The plan was further elaborated in the book ‘India 2020: A Vision for the New Millennium’, co-authored by Dr APJ Abdul Kalam and Dr YS Rajan. The plan visualised transforming India into a developed country by focusing on six core areas: Agriculture and Food Processing; Infrastructure; Education and Health Care; Information and Communication Technology; Critical Technologies and Strategic Industries; and Defence Technology.3 It is now nearly 20 years since the above report was prepared. Where do we stand today?
In a report released by the World Economic Forum in Geneva, India has been ranked at 100th position in a list of 124 countries on the Global Human Capital Index which measures countries on ‘development and deployment’ of human capital.4 Obviously, India has a long way to go on education, skill development, labour force participation and connected fields which will contribute towards making India a developed country.
It is, therefore, time for India to reset its vision. No doubt our National Vision ought to be – to transform India into a developed society. From where we stand today, it is not feasible to take a giant leap forward because even the fundamentals of a developed society are lacking. So, the pragmatic approach for India to transition into a developed society will have to be a phased one with well defined benchmarks along the way. The areas to be focused could be as under:-
Improve governance at grass roots level. Our weakest links are the block / tehsil and district levels of administration.
Primary and secondary education. We must aim for 100 per cent of our youth (male and female) to be educated upto atleast the secondary level and then be channelised into skill development.
Development of ‘Health Services’. We need to take our rural health services to the villages, especially in remote areas.
Development of communication network (roads and information technology) across the country, with special focus on rural areas.
Development of science and technology.
National Values
These are again intangibles which have no physical form but are felt and experienced by the people of a nation all the time. They reflect national character and behaviour in different situations, more so during times of wars, disasters and natural calamities. In the ancient times, India and Indians displayed a most sophisticated type of behaviour which greatly impressed those who came into contact with India; whether they were conquerors, traders, scholars, ambassadors or travellers. The spirituality, rich cultural heritage and high moral values of its rulers and people alike, left an indelible impression on those who came into contact with India. This was perhaps the reason that most invaders got assimilated into the Indian culture. Some of the ancient Indian values can be summarised as under:-
An open and all-embracing society. All inclusive concept of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ conveys the philosophy of ancient India.
A scientific temper.
Oneness of the God Almighty or the Creator and triumph of human spirit. The spirit of Sarva Dharma Sambhava’ has encouraged religious tolerance across the length and breadth of the country.
Qualities of integrity, loyalty and honesty were held in high esteem.
Hospitality, even to the foes, if they sought protection.
Magnanimity and forgiveness.
Selflessness; working without worrying about fruits of labour.
Strong family ties.
However, as we look at things today it is obvious that India’s ancient sense of values stands greatly eroded. There are a number of factors for this downward spiral; not in the least the Colonial rule for almost two centuries and slow pace of development post-Independence. India has not remained unaffected by globalisation and aspirations of the people have also risen. In this scramble for fruits of globalisation, the sense of values seems to have been given a ‘go by’ by a vast majority of the population which continues to exist below poverty line and yet see the ‘India shining’ from afar but beyond their reach. Somebody has rightly observed – morality, sense of propriety and izzpt are for those who can afford it. Due to the sheer compulsions of eking out an existence, majority of people will adopt any means to get on with life. This phenomenon can be seen in urban centres where crime rate is on the rise. This coupled with ever increasing migration from rural to urban centres makes an explosive situation. The motto of the younger generation of Indians seems to be – Me, Myself and for Myself. In order to reverse this trend and to reinforce a sense of ancient and traditional Indian values amongst the present and future generation of Indians, it is important to transform India into a developed society in stages as mentioned earlier. Thus, the road to re-invigorate a sense of national values lies through fulfilment of the national vision, i.e. to become a developed society, say by 2050.
India’s Geopolitical Environment
India today faces a two front scenario as far as external threats are concerned. One can say that such a situation has arisen due to historical legacies. A deeper introspection would reveal that such a situation has come to exist due to India’s failure to recognise ground realities and take action to neutralise or resolve such strategic questions that impinge on national security. Just to quote, Communist China too inherited land border problems with as many as 14 countries but moved in a deliberate and determined manner to resolve these with all, except India and Bhutan. Another example that can be quoted is that of Myanmar which resolved the border dispute with China based on McMahon Line within a few years of gaining Independence. The point that emerges is that it is India itself that will have to make the requisite moves to change its immediate geopolitical environment from a threatening one to a benign or a secure one; otherwise the cost of ensuring national security will continue to rise exponentially.
Let us look at the field a little afar in the extended neighbourhood. The developments in the Indo-Pacific Region are beginning to have much greater impact on India’s strategic interests. Our ‘Look East Policy’ which was initiated in 1991, primarily to boost our economic linkages with Southeast Asian countries has of late assumed strategic dimensions. However, the situation in the Indo-Pacific Region has become quite complex and is beginning to impact India, like never before. The US rebalancing to Asia – Pacific and China’s counter-measures have set into motion a kind of power play in which India could inadvertently get sucked. It is an area in which India ought to make ‘cold calculations’ to pursue its national interests.
To the West, India is restrained by the instability in Af-Pak Region and Pakistan’s intransigence to block India in its overtures to West Asia and Central Asia. China-Pak nexus and Pakistan’s obsession with strategic depth in Afghanistan are some of the other factors which serve to checkmate India in its westward moves to pursue its economic and strategic interests.
The latest of geopolitical challenges to India comes in the form of ‘One Belt-One Road Initiative’ of China which is taking shape in India’s neighbourhood quite rapidly. India has not responded to Chinese proposals so far in a resolute manner. Sooner than later, India will have to take a call, or else we will be faced with fait accompli. Today India has an opportunity to be equal partners, provided we can evolve a strategy and chart out our moves. India has the capacity and the capability to hedge any security implications of the Chinese initiative, more so in the maritime domain.
It can be surmised that India’s geo-political environment is changing fast and India needs to act in a resolute manner to shape the same to its advantage. A strong maritime capability coupled with deft diplomacy would not only serve to secure India’s interests in the maritime domain but also act as a hedge against any adventurism on the land frontiers. This is not to suggest that land and aerospace capabilities can be neglected. The way India is placed today; it needs to project a strong and balanced military capability in all dimensions to ensure that its vision of becoming a developed state is not disturbed by external forces.
India’s National Interests
Unfortunately, there is no such document put out by the Government of India which gives out India’s national interests or its grand strategy to secure the same. Hence, these have to be assumed or derived from various policy statements of our Leaders from time to time. While doing so it is important to understand ‘The Idea of India’ or the ‘Character of India’ which can be perceived and felt. India is a civilisational state and its soft power has a great deal of appeal the world over but that alone is not enough to secure its strategic objectives. It has to be backed by hard power and pro-active diplomacy. India’s vital national interests can be listed as under:-
National security and territorial integrity. This should include security in cyber and space domains.
Inclusive economic development which will include infrastructure, health, education, skill development etc.
Protection of environment.
A high degree of national integration leading to a spirit of nationalism and a harmonious society.
Effective governance and a corruption free society.
A sound technological base leading to self-reliance in strategic areas.
Contribute in global affairs according to capacity.
A responsive Higher Defence Organisation which will synergise military capabilities.
India’s Strategic Objectives
In the preceding paras we have outlined – what kind of India do we visualise, say by the middle of 21st Century. So, what are the big ‘strategic objectives’ for India of our dreams that if achieved, would take us nearer to our goal as a Nation? Many issues come to mind – poverty alleviation, health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, climate change and environment, energy, internal and external security, and so on. However, to realise all or some of these, two parameters are vital. First, the Nation has to feel secure from all kinds of threats and have the confidence in its ability to meet the challenges to its security that may arise in the foreseeable future. Secondly, good governance is a must for success on all fronts. In India’s case, it becomes all the more important because lack of or receding governance has been manifest in almost all fields, especially during the last four decades or so. Now it is impacting India’s growth story and the momentum of the early years of this Century seems to have been lost. So, this is something that India needs to fix immediately, failing which the whole dream of India’s rise to be a global player could collapse. The ramifications of such a failure for a population of 1.25 billion, more than half of which is below poverty line, are too horrendous and difficult to even imagine.
Let us now turn to the other big question – security. No doubt, national security in today’s world encompasses much more than just the country’s air space, land and maritime frontiers. In essence, the country should be able to pursue its national interests without undue external influences and equally important, its citizens should feel secure. It is not always possible to forecast or visualise precisely various threats, challenges and opportunities that may arise at a future date. However, based on the geostrategic environment, past events and prevailing trends, it is possible to visualise the kind of challenges and opportunities that may emerge internally, in the neighbourhood, regionally and globally.
As mentioned earlier, dealing with China would present a major strategic dilemma. China is following a strategy of indirect approach in dealing with India, i.e. using Pakistan as its proxy to constrain India in strategic terms within South Asia. It is true that the Modi Government has taken some fresh initiatives to shape India’s geostrategic environment but it is too early to say which way the wind would blow and whether these initiatives would be able to unravel the knots that have remained untied for so many decades.
As of today, we are also experiencing an asymmetric threat from Pakistan by way of jihadi terrorism, and that is not confined to Jammu and Kashmir alone. This is further complicated by the power dynamics in Pakistan and continued instability in Afghanistan. In fact, Afghanistan – post American withdrawal, poses a security challenge for the entire region. India though impacted is not a direct player in the evolving situation in Afghanistan.
In addition, there are other challenges on account of various ongoing insurgencies, climate change, energy security, food security, unemployment etc. On the social front, India is faced with the challenges of human resource development, health, education, corruption, poor infrastructure and above all – how to manage the social change that is taking place across the Country? Having stated threats, concerns and the challenges that India is facing or is likely to face, let us ask ourselves – what then is the big strategic question that India must prepare for?
To my mind, the answer seems to be – how should India deal with a possible collusive nexus between China and Pakistan? If we can face or deflect this challenge without compromising on our national values, other challenges and concerns will be taken care of automatically. It is a complex challenge and it requires a grand strategy to meet the same. Building of military capability alone and that too in a sporadic manner would not suffice. The answer lies in building the Comprehensive National Power (CNP) in a phased manner which would turn India into a developed Nation.
Since the end of the Cold War the world order is in a state of flux. The multipolar world has not emerged. The days of military alliances (though NATO has survived) also seem to be over. This is an age of multilateral engagements, understandings and strategic partnerships. Nations are hedging to deflect possible threats and manoeuvring all the time to gain a position of advantage.
India has established for itself a reputation of strategic autonomy in decision making and it is beginning to be respected the world over. Our soft power is also attracting many nations. Keeping in view India’s size, population, resource base and geostrategic location, India ought to emerge as an ‘Independent Centre of Power’ which can play a meaningful role in global affairs.
India’s strategic objectives can be summarised as under:-
Transformation into a developed society.
Build Comprehensive National Power.
Be prepared to meet a collusive threat from China and Pakistan across the entire spectrum of conflict.
Develop into an ‘Independent Centre of Power’.
Conclusion
Since Independence India has faced numerous challenges to its national security. Our responses have been a mixed bag; a few successes but also a number of failures or not so satisfactory outcomes from our point of view. However, India has managed to stay the course in order to build strong democratic credentials and sustain a reasonable growth trajectory. However, India has fallen way behind in matters of governance and fulfilling the aspirations of multitudes of its people. India needs to focus its energies and resources to be able to manage the socio-economic change taking place successfully.
India faces a complex geopolitical environment. To meet the challenges of such an environment, India must develop pro-active and pragmatic politico-diplomatic responses backed by a strong military with a responsive Higher Defence Organisation. At this stage of Indian history it is important to stay the course of economic development without any external powers or influences being able to derail the process. This is the supreme national interest.
By virtue of its size, population and geo-strategic location, India must be able to play an active role in regional and global affairs. India also must be seen as a dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean and a stabilising force in the region. It is important to maintain strategic autonomy in decision making that has become the hallmark of Indian foreign policy. India ought to develop into an ‘Independent Centre of Power’ towards which other nations may gravitate.
To be able to achieve all of the above and to stay the course that India has set for itself, it is important for India to build its CNP in a phased but determined manner so that it can preserve its national values, pursue its development goals unhindered and thus fulfil the aspirations of its people.
Based on India’s National Interests as outlined earlier it should be possible to determine Strategic objectives that India ought to pursue in order to achieve its vision of a developed society in the foreseeable future. The objectives should not only serve the National Interests but must also be achievable. The overarching Strategic Objective would be to build Comprehensive National Power (CNP) which would enable India to play its rightful role in global affairs. There is no reason why India should remain confined to the region only. Some of the pre-requisites for building CNP are as under:-
A high rate of growth. India should aim to achieve and sustain a growth rate of 8 – 10 per cent for at least two decades. It must be ensured that the growth is inclusive and covers the underprivileged.
The growth must be sustainable in the long term. The environment and climate change need to be factored into our growth story.
A viable strategy to ensure energy security. India need to lay special emphasis on renewable sources of energy, diverse imports, create strategic reserves and enhance indigenous capacity.
Invest in research and development in the field of Science and Technology to achieve self – reliance in core strategic sectors.
Long term measures for human resource development and deployment. Skill development amongst the youth is a major restraining factor which needs to be addressed.
Infrastructure development by way of roads, railways, ports, airfields, connectivity and so on.
Boost to health and education sectors.
Enhance production of minerals and rare earths.
Increase manufacturing capacity in core sectors and consumer goods.
Build Military – Industrial Complex to achieve self-reliance in Defence Sector.
Build a strong, balanced and modern Military which will be able to protect India’s national interests.
Apart from the above measures, it is vital that India creates strong institutions of the State and visionary leadership which will steer the country towards realising its full potential which so far has remained dormant or untapped. Leadership is an important issue for building CNP. Towards that end India must create institutions, even outside the Government that will contribute to honing of leadership skills amongst the national leadership. The importance of policy making and decision making needs to be appreciated because on it depends the motivation level of the Nation to face adverse situations. Leadership is an intangible but it is the most important ingredient for building and sustaining national morale as also the CNP.
Endnotes
1 The UN Human Development Report 2014, Explanatory Notes.
2 Dr SP Gupta, Dec 2002, Report of the Committee on India Vision 2020, Planning Commission Government of India.
3 Dr APJ Abdul Kalam with Dr YS Rajan, India 2020: A Vision for the New Millennium, Penguin Books (P) Ltd. 1998.
4 The Times of India, New Delhi, Friday, 15 May 2015.
@ Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd) is the Deputy Director & Editor at USI. He has written a number of articles on the 1962 and 1965 Wars, and has also edited a recent USI Study “1962 – A View from the Other Side of the Hill”.
Section II
Internal Security Horizon Scan
Changing Nature of Low Intensity Conflicts in the North East: Its Internal And External Linkages
Lieutenant General VK Nayar, PVSM, SM (Retd)@
The insurgencies in the Northeast are a heady mix of change and continuity. While the complexion of conflicts is undergoing changes, the historical, cultural and locational dynamics continue to influence perceptions and attitudes. A brief mention of these is therefore not only relevant but also essential. Locational isolation and inaccessibility continue to ferment socio- political instability, retard economic development, which is accentuated by influx of immigrants, land alienation and lack of infrastructure. After Independence our policies should have been guided by the primary needs for social and economic integration of the Northeast and emerging geopolitical and security imperatives. Instead, we continued the British policy of exclusiveness and isolation, which kept the Northeast distanced.
Developments in the socio-political field after Independence generated a conflict prone environment due to clash between old systems and values and modern ones. Traditional rural elite being replaced by modern urban oriented and self-governing system being replaced by a centralised and formal one. Our failure to harmonise and absorb the traditional institutions into the system added to antagonism and the same institutions are being exploited by the politicians and insurgents. Modern political system is accompanied by increasing corruption and permissiveness adding to people’s deprivation. The extension of Sixth Schedule to hills has not helped; it has created multiple layers of administration, divided people on ethnic lines, led to ethnic parochialism, an inducement for exploitation and raised the question of identity.
The ethnic factor is central and omnipresent in all facets of life in the Northeast. In the plains it is a reaction to tribal assertion into their area and threat posed by immigrants. It is central to security, economic development and the crucial issue of territory. It influences politics, generates and acts as a catalyst for conflicts. It is a stabilising factor at the individual, village and community level due to social structure of societies but it causes instability and conflict at state and regional level. A key element in the growth of ethnic sensibility in the Northeast is the perceived boundaries of tribal communities; the situation is further precipitated by fractured or disputed borders. Ethnic politics have narrow parochial aims and are adverse to unity and cause conflict. Naga/Kuki conflict of 1992/93 and subsequent ethnic conflicts have led to fragmentation of societies, politics and conflicts. Both political elite and insurgents have exploited ethnic sensitivities in pursuit of power, increasing areas of influence, control of resources and even drug trade. Division of societies and splintering of insurgent groups is the biggest challenge for governance and security. In this regard State Governments are fully responsible and they cannot abdicate their constitutional duty and pass the buck to the Centre.
Changing Nature and Complexion of Insurgencies
The changing nature of insurgencies in the Northeast is essentially reflection of the changing and evolving socio-cultural and politico-economic milieu discussed above. As we shall see in the following review of different areas of the Northeast, the insurgent groups have shed their ideological moorings, the great and noble cause of independence and secession has become defunct, their core remains separatist and anti-establishment in rhetoric and they are open to negotiations, securing autonomy and special status in the system. New and old slogans of anti foreigners/outsiders, ethnic integration and looking back to their roots as a reaction to perceived imposition of Indianness on them. In Manipur and Tripura leftist and anti- people slogans come up due to historical affinity. The level of motivation of these may not be that high but these are equally lethal. Of these ethnic mobilisation is most potent. Similarly political mobilisation in the Northeast is influenced by their divergent historical experience, social and cultural diversity and distinctiveness, which forges a common cause with local militant groups.
With the insurgent support bases shifting to urban areas, where material and financial resources (mostly Govt) are, sharing these between political elite, bureaucracy and insurgents has become a convenient way for power propagation to the advantage of all. This has also resulted in insurgent’s covert presence in urban centres to tap resources and influencing population even by coercion if necessary, which is best achieved by exploiting ethnic ties. Insurgencies in the Northeast are not set to a pattern; similarities are confined to opposition to federal and local control and perceived dictates and challenging it with violence.
Naga insurgency is rightly called the mother of all insurgencies in the Northeast as it set the tone and tenor for others to follow. Both Naga and Mizo insurgencies fermented due to deep-rooted historical sense of independence as also fuelled by real and perceived dominance of Assamese and Indian State, therefore fight for secession. In the case of Mizo’s decline in intensity of operations in 1970s, denial of bases in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) on creation of Bangladesh and with Shanti Bahini presence, desire for peace by the entire Mizo community and church, political sagacity of Lalthanhawala brought Mizo National Front (MNF) to negotiations and acceptance of a political space in the federal system and peace. Peripheral conflict with Bru or Riangs since 1997 is ethnic in nature as a reaction to Mizo domination and needs to be resolved locally.
Ageing Naga leadership’s realisation of the future generation’s reluctance to undertake privations of struggle, split in the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) due to tribal rivalry and pressure from the Naga society that the dominant faction NSCN Issac Swu and Muivah (IM) agreed to ceasefire in 1997, negotiations and climbing down from independence and secession to a special status. NSCN (K) followed and signed the ceasefire agreement in April 2001. Inspite of NSCN factions Unification and Truce of 2007 and later Covent of Reconciliation between leaders of both factions of NSCN and Naga National Council (NNC) in 2009 neither resulted in stoppage of inter factional clashes or further splits. NSCN (K) split into Khole and Kitovi factions and Zialiangs of Manipur broke away from NSCN (IM). Renewed efforts to close ranks resulted in a joint declaration to form a Naga National Govt in 2011 signed by Issac Swu and Muviah of NSCN (IM), Khole and Kitovi of NSCN (K) and NSCN (KK) and Signya and Zhopra Vero of NNC. While Naga factions observe ceasefire with Security Forces (SF), they fight each other for influence and area domination, collect taxes, indulge in extortions and violate ceasefire rules, move freely with arms, with SF and Govt as mute spectators. In April 2012 Naga youth staged a huge protest against Govt inaction. NSCN (IM) continues smuggling of arms as was proved by the arrest of Anthony Shimray in 2010 and their Thai middleman Narue in Thailand in 2013. The question of extension of ceasefire to Naga areas beyond Nagaland is viewed as incursion into their territory and led to violent protests in Manipur in 2001 in which nineteen people were killed. Similarly, closure of NH-39 and 53, particularly NH-39 by Naga insurgents and tax collection on these is a cause of great social and economic harassment to Manipur and shows Central Govt’s apathy. Nexus between Naga politicians in Nagaland and Manipur is well known. There was blatant foisting of legitimacy to insurgents by Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphu Rio, who moved a resolution in November 2009 in the assembly, “acknowledging the sacrifices made by them for the common cause of Nagas”, which was passed unanimously by all sixty members including nineteen of opposition.
In a recent development NSCN (K) pulled out of the ceasefire agreement signed with the centre on 27 March 2015 and renewed its attack on Security Forces. The worst was against Assam Rifles in Mon district on 3 May resulting in eight casualties. It also coincided with formation of a new collation United Liberation Front of West South-East Asia consisting of NSCN (K), ULFA (Paresh Burua), Kanglei Yawol Kanan Lup (KYKL), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and NDFB (S). The above development not only poses a challenge for security management but also portends greater violence in Nagaland and Manipur.
In Assam most insurgent group (seventeen) are negotiating with the Govt; but, it has also resulted in anti-talk and new splinter groups emerging. Prominent amongst anti-talk groups are Paresh Barua group of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and Songbijit faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). While after effects of violence against Muslim immigrants since 2008 were just being overcome, fresh Bodo- immigrant Muslim clashes in July and September 2012 resulted in one hundred and five deaths and five thousand houses burnt. Recent Bodo attacks in May 2014 against Muslim immigrants followed by attacks against adivasis in December further deepened ethnic and communal divide and resulted in Muslim militant organisations Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and Jammat-ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) and adivasi armed organisations like Adivasi People’s Army, Adivasi National Liberation Army, Burse Commando Force and Santhal Tigers. Adivasis have also demanded ST status. Karbi and Dimasa militant organisation United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDS), splintered first after the ceasefire in 2002 and again after the accord with the Govt in 2011, anti talk group calling itself Karbi Longri North Chachar Hills Liberation Front and the second splinter group in 2011 calling itself Karbi People’s Liberation front. Similarly Dima Halam Daoga (DHD) split in 2003 with the new group calling itself DHD J). Assam’s splintering mosaic has added Maoist Red to it. With Maoist establishing roots in nine districts of Tin Sukia, Diburgarh, Dhemaji, Lakhimpur and Golaghat in the East, and Chachar and Karimgang in South and Namsai district of Lohit division of Arunachal Pradesh. The Assam Govt has in the meanwhile been busy with factional fights within the party.
In Manipur, Meitei insurgency needs to be viewed in ideological and cultural context of Vaishnavite and communist overflow from the main land and Meitei’s comparative deprivation compared to tribals, while they were much closer to the national mainstream. It led to turning to old Sena Mai religion, going back to their roots, which led to secessionist tendencies and sub nationalism. Meitei Extremists (ME) are not open to negotiations, surrenders and have sustained their cadres. Political instability, ever increasing corruption and bad governance has added to people alienation. ME politician and bureaucratic nexus has made common cause in siphoning Govt finances and resources and wide spread extortions and kidnappings, while exploiting peoples alienation to cover their misdeeds. Meitei insurgency is an industrial enterprise with criminal intent with ME and local establishment as equal partners. The nature and complexion of Naga insurgency in the hill districts is similar to Nagaland with NSCN factions in open confrontation for furthering their own designs. The Naga-Kuki Conflict in 1993 has resulted in further ethnic divide with diverse Kuki militant organisations adding to the militant mosaic. Frequent interference with NH- 39 by Nagas and tax regime operating there, demand of Nagalim and Sadar Hills by Kukis apart from deepening ethnic divide has added to Meitei’s sense of encirclement. Intelligence agencies and SF’s use of Kukis against Nagas has further vitiated the insurgency environment.